Skip to content
StrikeOps

NTLMv1 Authentication Allowed

HighTypical severity Active DirectoryCWE-327ATT&CK T1557.001

01Description

Hosts were configured to accept or send NTLMv1 authentication (LAN Manager authentication level below 'Send NTLMv2 response only. Refuse LM & NTLM').

02Impact

NTLMv1 uses weak cryptography. Captured NTLMv1 responses can be reliably converted to the account's NT hash, which can then be used for pass-the-hash. If a domain controller's machine account authenticates with NTLMv1, the domain can be compromised.

03Severity

Typically

High

Typically High. High, as captured NTLMv1 responses can be converted to the account's NT hash. Critical if domain controllers accept NTLMv1 from machine accounts.

04How to verify

  1. 1Review the 'Network security: LAN Manager authentication level' setting in Group Policy.
  2. 2Audit NTLM authentication events on domain controllers to identify NTLMv1 use.
  3. 3Where authorized, capture authentication to confirm the version used.

Testing note: only test systems you are authorized to test, within the agreed scope and rules of engagement. Verification steps are written for professional testers and avoid destructive techniques.

05Remediation

  1. 1Set the LAN Manager authentication level to 'Send NTLMv2 response only. Refuse LM & NTLM' across the domain.
  2. 2Audit NTLM usage first to identify legacy systems that would break, and upgrade them.
  3. 3Plan to restrict NTLM further and prefer Kerberos.

06References

Draft findings like this from your own evidence

Book a demo
Book a demo