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StrikeOps

LLMNR and NBT-NS Poisoning

HighTypical severity Network and infrastructureCWE-350ATT&CK T1557.001

01Description

Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) were enabled on the internal network. When DNS lookups fail, Windows hosts fall back to these broadcast protocols, and any host on the same network segment can respond and impersonate the requested name.

02Impact

An attacker on the internal network can answer these broadcast requests and capture NTLMv2 authentication hashes from users and systems. The hashes can be cracked offline to recover passwords or relayed to other hosts, frequently providing the first valid domain credentials in an internal attack.

03Severity

Typically

High

Typically High. Commonly High on internal tests because it reliably yields credential hashes within minutes. Lower to Medium if strong password policy and SMB signing prevent cracking and relay.

04How to verify

  1. 1Listen passively for LLMNR (UDP 5355) and NBT-NS (UDP 137) traffic on the internal segment.
  2. 2Where authorized, run a poisoning tool such as Responder in analysis mode, then active mode, and record the hashes captured.
  3. 3Attempt offline cracking of captured hashes against a wordlist to assess password strength.

Testing note: only test systems you are authorized to test, within the agreed scope and rules of engagement. Verification steps are written for professional testers and avoid destructive techniques.

05Remediation

  1. 1Disable LLMNR through Group Policy: Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Network > DNS Client > 'Turn off multicast name resolution' set to Enabled.
  2. 2Disable NetBIOS over TCP/IP on all interfaces, via DHCP option or network adapter settings.
  3. 3Require SMB signing to prevent relay of any credentials still captured.
  4. 4Enforce long, unique passwords so captured hashes resist cracking.

06References

Draft findings like this from your own evidence

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