01Description
Active Directory Certificate Services web enrollment endpoints accepted NTLM authentication over HTTP without Extended Protection for Authentication (EPA).
02Impact
An attacker can coerce a domain controller to authenticate and relay that authentication to the web enrollment endpoint, obtaining a certificate for the domain controller and compromising the domain.
03Severity
Typically
Critical
Typically Critical. Critical where coercion of a domain controller is possible, as relaying its authentication to web enrollment yields a certificate for the domain controller.
04How to verify
- 1Identify AD CS web enrollment and certificate enrollment web service endpoints.
- 2Check whether HTTP is allowed, NTLM accepted and EPA disabled, for example with Certipy.
- 3Where authorized, demonstrate relay using a designated test machine rather than a production domain controller.
Testing note: only test systems you are authorized to test, within the agreed scope and rules of engagement. Verification steps are written for professional testers and avoid destructive techniques.
05Remediation
- 1Disable web enrollment if not required.
- 2Otherwise require HTTPS and enable Extended Protection for Authentication, and disable NTLM on the endpoints.
- 3Disable the Print Spooler and other coercion paths on domain controllers.
06References
Draft findings like this from your own evidence
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