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StrikeOps

Unconstrained Kerberos Delegation

HighTypical severity Active DirectoryCWE-269ATT&CK T1558

01Description

Computer or user accounts other than domain controllers were configured with unconstrained Kerberos delegation ('Trust this computer for delegation to any service').

02Impact

Hosts with unconstrained delegation store the Kerberos ticket-granting tickets of users who authenticate to them. An attacker who compromises such a host can coerce a domain controller to authenticate to it, capture the domain controller's ticket and use it to compromise the entire domain.

03Severity

Typically

High

Typically High. High, as compromise of any host with unconstrained delegation can lead to domain compromise through authentication coercion. Domain controllers are excluded as they require it by design.

04How to verify

  1. 1Enumerate accounts with the TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION flag, excluding domain controllers.
  2. 2Assess how an attacker could reach or compromise each affected host.
  3. 3Check whether privileged accounts are marked as sensitive and cannot be delegated.

Testing note: only test systems you are authorized to test, within the agreed scope and rules of engagement. Verification steps are written for professional testers and avoid destructive techniques.

05Remediation

  1. 1Remove unconstrained delegation and replace it with constrained or resource-based constrained delegation scoped to specific services.
  2. 2Mark privileged accounts as 'Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated' and add them to the Protected Users group.
  3. 3Disable the Print Spooler service on domain controllers and servers that do not need it to limit coercion.

06References

Draft findings like this from your own evidence

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