01Description
The application fetched a URL supplied by the user without restricting the destination, allowing requests to be made from the server to internal or unintended systems.
02Impact
An attacker can use the server to reach internal services, scan the internal network, and in cloud environments request the instance metadata service to obtain temporary credentials for the cloud account.
03Severity
Typically
High
Typically High. High by default. Critical when the server can reach cloud metadata services or internal administrative interfaces, as this often exposes credentials.
04How to verify
- 1Identify features that fetch URLs, such as webhooks, imports, previews and PDF generators.
- 2Test whether internal addresses, localhost and the cloud metadata address are reachable, using an out-of-band callback to confirm requests.
- 3Where authorized, demonstrate impact with a non-sensitive internal response only.
Testing note: only test systems you are authorized to test, within the agreed scope and rules of engagement. Verification steps are written for professional testers and avoid destructive techniques.
05Remediation
- 1Allow outbound requests only to an explicit list of destinations.
- 2Block private, loopback and link-local address ranges after DNS resolution, and re-check on redirects.
- 3Require IMDSv2 on AWS and restrict metadata access from application workloads.
- 4Run URL-fetching features in an isolated network segment.
06References
Draft findings like this from your own evidence
Book a demo