01Description
EC2 instances allowed the legacy Instance Metadata Service version 1, which answers simple GET requests without a session token.
02Impact
Any server-side request forgery flaw in an application on the instance can retrieve the instance role's temporary credentials, giving the attacker the role's cloud permissions.
03Severity
Typically
Medium
Typically Medium. Medium by default. High on instances running web applications with SSRF exposure or carrying privileged roles.
04How to verify
- 1Review instance metadata options for HttpTokens set to optional.
- 2Identify instance roles and their permissions.
Testing note: only test systems you are authorized to test, within the agreed scope and rules of engagement. Verification steps are written for professional testers and avoid destructive techniques.
05Remediation
- 1Require IMDSv2 (HttpTokens: required) on all instances and set it as the account default.
- 2Set a hop limit of 1 where containers should not reach metadata.
- 3Apply least privilege to instance roles.
Draft findings like this from your own evidence
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