01Description
The tenant did not have dedicated emergency access (break-glass) accounts, or the accounts that existed were not protected and monitored to Microsoft's guidance. Break-glass accounts are cloud-only Global Administrator accounts kept out of normal use and excluded from Conditional Access so administrators can recover from a lockout.
02Impact
Without break-glass accounts, a faulty Conditional Access policy, a federation or MFA service outage, or the departure of the only administrator can lock the organization out of its own tenant. Where break-glass accounts exist but are unmonitored, they become an attractive target: they hold Global Administrator and bypass Conditional Access, so any misuse goes unnoticed.
03Severity
Typically
Medium
Typically Medium. Medium where no break-glass accounts exist, because a misconfigured policy or MFA outage can lock out all administrators. Raise to High where break-glass accounts exist but use weak passwords, have no strong authentication, or have no sign-in alerting.
04How to verify
- 1List Global Administrator assignments in the Entra admin center (Roles and administrators > Global Administrator) and identify any accounts designated for emergency access.
- 2Check that each emergency account is cloud-only (on the onmicrosoft.com domain, not synchronized from on-premises), uses a phishing-resistant method such as a FIDO2 security key or certificate-based authentication, and is excluded from Conditional Access in a documented way.
- 3Confirm an alert fires on any sign-in by these accounts, for example a log alert in Azure Monitor or a Microsoft Sentinel analytics rule on the sign-in logs.
Testing note: only test systems you are authorized to test, within the agreed scope and rules of engagement. Verification steps are written for professional testers and avoid destructive techniques.
05Remediation
- 1Create two cloud-only emergency access accounts on the tenant's onmicrosoft.com domain, permanently assigned Global Administrator and not tied to any individual.
- 2Protect them with phishing-resistant authentication (FIDO2 security keys or certificate-based authentication) stored securely, since Microsoft now enforces MFA on admin portal sign-ins.
- 3Exclude them from Conditional Access policies that could cause a lockout, and record the exclusion in policy documentation.
- 4Send Entra sign-in and audit logs to a Log Analytics workspace and alert on every sign-in by these accounts.
- 5Test the accounts on a set schedule and document the procedure for using them.
Draft findings like this from your own evidence
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