Skip to content
StrikeOps

No Emergency Access (Break-Glass) Accounts, or Accounts Not Monitored

MediumTypical severity Cloud and Microsoft 365

01Description

The tenant did not have dedicated emergency access (break-glass) accounts, or the accounts that existed were not protected and monitored to Microsoft's guidance. Break-glass accounts are cloud-only Global Administrator accounts kept out of normal use and excluded from Conditional Access so administrators can recover from a lockout.

02Impact

Without break-glass accounts, a faulty Conditional Access policy, a federation or MFA service outage, or the departure of the only administrator can lock the organization out of its own tenant. Where break-glass accounts exist but are unmonitored, they become an attractive target: they hold Global Administrator and bypass Conditional Access, so any misuse goes unnoticed.

03Severity

Typically

Medium

Typically Medium. Medium where no break-glass accounts exist, because a misconfigured policy or MFA outage can lock out all administrators. Raise to High where break-glass accounts exist but use weak passwords, have no strong authentication, or have no sign-in alerting.

04How to verify

  1. 1List Global Administrator assignments in the Entra admin center (Roles and administrators > Global Administrator) and identify any accounts designated for emergency access.
  2. 2Check that each emergency account is cloud-only (on the onmicrosoft.com domain, not synchronized from on-premises), uses a phishing-resistant method such as a FIDO2 security key or certificate-based authentication, and is excluded from Conditional Access in a documented way.
  3. 3Confirm an alert fires on any sign-in by these accounts, for example a log alert in Azure Monitor or a Microsoft Sentinel analytics rule on the sign-in logs.

Testing note: only test systems you are authorized to test, within the agreed scope and rules of engagement. Verification steps are written for professional testers and avoid destructive techniques.

05Remediation

  1. 1Create two cloud-only emergency access accounts on the tenant's onmicrosoft.com domain, permanently assigned Global Administrator and not tied to any individual.
  2. 2Protect them with phishing-resistant authentication (FIDO2 security keys or certificate-based authentication) stored securely, since Microsoft now enforces MFA on admin portal sign-ins.
  3. 3Exclude them from Conditional Access policies that could cause a lockout, and record the exclusion in policy documentation.
  4. 4Send Entra sign-in and audit logs to a Log Analytics workspace and alert on every sign-in by these accounts.
  5. 5Test the accounts on a set schedule and document the procedure for using them.

06References

Draft findings like this from your own evidence

Book a demo
Book a demo